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Abstract During situations of response conflict, cognitive
control is characterized by prefrontal theta-band (3- to 8-Hz)
activity. It has been shown that cognitive control can be trig-
gered proactively by contextual cues that predict conflict.
Here, we investigated whether a pretrial preparation interval
could serve as such a cue. This would show that the temporal
contingencies embedded in the task can be used to anticipate
upcoming conflict. To this end, we recorded electroencepha-
lography (EEG) from 30 human subjects while they per-
formed a version of a Simon task in which the duration of a
fixation cross between trials predicted whether the next trial
would contain response conflict. Both their behavior and EEG
activity showed a consistent but unexpected pattern of results:
The conflict effect (increased reaction times and decreased
accuracy on conflict as compared to nonconflict trials) was
stronger when conflict was cued, and this was associated with
stronger conflict-related midfrontal theta activity and func-
tional connectivity. Interestingly, intervals that predicted con-
flict did show a pretarget increase in midfrontal theta power.
These findings suggest that temporally guided expectations of
conflict do heighten conflict anticipation, but also lead to less
efficiently applied reactive control. We further explored this
post-hoc interpretation by means of three behavioral follow-
up experiments, in which we used nontemporal cues, seman-
tically informative cues, and neutral cues. Together, this body
of results suggests that the counterintuitive cost of conflict
cueing may not be uniquely related to the temporal domain,
but may instead be related to the implicitness and validity of
the cue.
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Cognitive control refers to a set of mental capacities devoted
to optimize goal-directed behavior in situations of multiple
competing response alternatives (Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Forstmann, Wylie,
Burle, & van den Wildenberg, 2010; Ridderinkhof,
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Neuroscience has
tied these adaptive control functions to processes in frontal
brain networks (Fuster, 2000; E. K. Miller, 2000), where the
medial frontal cortex (MFC) is thought to signal the need for
control in response to challenging situations (Alexander &
Brown, 2011; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Ito,
Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003), which is communicated
to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; MacDonald,
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Both of these regions exert
top-down influence over lower, task-related sensorimotor pro-
cessing (Cohen, van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, & Lamme, 2009;
Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger,
2011; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; B. T. Miller & D’Esposito,
2005), in order to adjust future behavior (Kerns et al., 2004).
Cognitive electrophysiology has provided compelling
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evidence of theta-band (3- to 8-Hz) oscillatory activity as the
underlying “language” of communication within this network
(see Cavanagh& Frank, 2014, and Cohen, 2014, for reviews),
where the MFC has been proposed to be a “hub” for theta
phase-synchronized information transfer (Cohen, 2011).
Cognitive control is a transient response, waxing and wan-
ing depending on the presence or absence of risks or demands
such as response conflict. Indeed, because frontally mediated
cognitive control is effortful, it is inefficient to recruit these
mechanisms continuously (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et al.,
2004). Here, conflict is defined as the incongruence between
a task-relevant learned response and a task-irrelevant stimulus
feature, which results in slower and more error-prone behavior
relative to nonconflict (the “conflict effect”). The immediate
trial history in a typical conflict task influences the level of
activated control in the subsequent trial (the “congruency se-
quence effect” [CSE]; Egner, 2007; Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1992). When the previous trial imposed conflict,
the cognitive control system is engaged, resulting in better
performance on the subsequent conflict trial. Importantly, the-
se trial-to-trial fluctuations in behavioral conflict effects have
been shown to covary with trial-to-trial variability in
midfrontal theta activity (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011).
Although the CSE could be regarded as a form of anticipa-
tory control through conflict adaptation (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Egner, 2007), i t is st i l l reactive in nature
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2010): Earlier conflict detection boosts
adaptive control, as called forth by conflict encountered on the
subsequent trial. Anticipatory control can be triggered
proactively as well, by means of contextual cues (Gratton
et al., 1992). For example, when an informative red cross-
sign symbol was presented always before an incongruent
arrow-flanker target, performance improved relative to when
an uninformative question-mark symbol was used as the cue
(Correa, Rao, & Nobre, 2009). Interestingly, this behavioral
cueing effect was accompanied by the attenuation of a frontal
N2 component (see also Strack, Kaufmann, Kehrer, Brandt, &
Stürmer, 2013), a potential neural marker of conflict process-
ing (van Veen & Carter, 2002; cf. Cohen & Donner, 2013).
Similar cueing effects have been found with other conflict
tasks and type of cues, ranging from semantically informative
word cues preceding the target (Alpay, Goerke, & Stürmer,
2009; Wühr & Kunde, 2008), to the spatial location (Corballis
& Gratton, 2003; Crump, Gong, & Milliken, 2006) or color
(Lehle & Hübner, 2008) of the target itself.
One potentially relevant source of contextual information
has received surprisingly little attention in the conflict-cueing
literature: time. Temporal contingencies between events are
ubiquitous in our natural environment and provide informa-
tion about which actions to take and when. For example, while
approaching a traffic light, seeing it change from green to
yellow triggers a cascade of temporal predictions (e.g., how
long is the light going to be yellow before it turns red, when
will I arrive at the traffic light given my speed?), which ulti-
mately results in a decision: Should I stop or not? The litera-
ture on temporal orienting has shown that temporally predict-
able stimuli trigger time-dependent preparatory neural dynam-
ics, as well as faster and more accurate behavioral responses
(see Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007, for a review). For exam-
ple, in a color–word Stroop task in which the intervals be-
tween the irrelevant (color) and relevant (word) stimulus di-
mensions were predictable rather than random, subjects were
able to strategically allocate attention in time to reduce the cost
of Stroop interference (Appelbaum, Boehler, Won, Davis, &
Woldorff, 2012). Although these accounts relate to temporal
predictions about when a stimulus will occur and when to
respond to it, it is less clear whether temporal predictions
can be made about when conflict is most likely to occur. In
other words, can temporal information be used as a cue to
predict conflict?
To our knowledge, only one prior study has specifically
addressed this question. In a letter-flanker task, Wendt and
Kiesel (2011) varied the contingencies between the proportion
of incongruent trials and the duration of a pretarget fixation
cross (the “warning signal,” also sometimes called the
“foreperiod”), such that subjects could predict the likelihood
of upcoming conflict on the basis of temporal information.
According to the authors, this is a purely endogenous form
of proactive control: The internally generated estimation of
the fixation-cross duration provides the conflict-predicting in-
formation, not the exogenous presentation of the fixation-
cross per se. Their behavioral findings seemed to indicate that
subjects were indeed able to use these temporal cues to pre-
pare for upcoming conflict, but only when long (1,200-ms)
instead of short (200-ms) durations were associated with a
high probability of conflict.
The goal of the present study was twofold. First, we aimed
to replicate the temporal-cueing effect observed byWendt and
Kiesel (2011), using another type of conflict task. Second, we
reasoned that measuring electroencephalography (EEG) while
using temporal cues would provide a valuable tool to investi-
gate the online neural dynamics of cognitive control during
temporal conflict anticipation. Here, we used a color–location
Simon task (Simon&Rudell, 1967), in which wemanipulated
the duration of a pretarget fixation cross so as to predict with
80% validity the congruency of the upcoming trial, analogous
to the Wendt and Kiesel paradigm. Specifically, we hypothe-
sized that (1) the behavioral conflict effect would reduce when
conflict rather than nonconflict was cued, and (2) that conflict-
related midfrontal theta activity, often observed as being
locked to the response (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011), would
shift to the pretarget conflict-predicting intervals. Finally, we
assessed in three follow-up behavioral experiments whether
our findings extended to (i) nontemporal symbolic cues, (ii)
explicit word cues, and (iii) noninformative versus determin-
istic cues.
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Materials and method
Subjects
For the EEG experiment, 34 subjects participated in exchange
for €20 or course credit. The data of four subjects were ex-
cluded because of excessive muscle artifacts in the EEG sig-
nal, problems during the EEG recording, or performance at
chance level (accuracy ~50 %) in one or more blocks of the
task. Thus, in total the data of 30 subjects were included in the
analyses (age range 19–32 years, M = 22.9; 24 females, six
males, two left-handed). For the three follow-up behavioral
experiments, a total of 51 subjects participated (Follow-Up
Exp. 1: N = 20, 14 females, six males; age range 18–31 years,
M = 22.2; Exp. 2: N = 16, ten females, six males; age range
19–24 years, M = 21.4; Exp. 3: N = 15, 12 females, three
males; age range 18–30 years, M = 23.3). One subject was
excluded from the analysis of Follow-Up Experiment 2 be-
cause of chance-level performance. In all experiments, the
subjects did not report neurological and psychiatric disorders
or the use of psychotropic drugs, and all reported having nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision. Subjects signed an in-
formed consent form before participation. The experiments
were approved by the local ethics committee, and all proce-
dures complied with the relevant laws and institutional
guidelines.
Task
In all experiments, subjects performed a modified version of
the Simon task. In each trial, a colored circle (hereafter re-
ferred to as the “target”) appeared on a light grey screen.
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
with their left thumb for blue and yellow targets, and with
their right thumb for red and green targets (or vice versa;
color–response mapping was counterbalanced across sub-
jects). Targets subtended 0.70 deg of visual angle (dva) and
appeared for 100 ms at 5.02 dva left or right from a fixation
point, which consisted of a small dark gray square of 0.10 dva
in the center of the screen. Trials ended upon responding or
after a response window of 1,000 ms had passed, in which
case feedback on response speed was presented, with the
words “respond faster!” The trial end was followed by an
intertrial interval of 1,000 ms, during which the fixation point
remained on screen.
Response conflict was induced on incongruent trials, in
which the location of the target corresponded to the spatially
incompatible response hand (e.g., if the blue target, which
required a left-hand response, appeared right of the fixation
point). On congruent trials, the target location always
corresponded to the spatially compatible response hand. One
half of trials were incongruent, and congruent and incongruent
trials were presented in random order (see below for random-
ization procedure).
Each trial started with a nonconflict pretarget cue that pre-
dicted the congruency of the upcoming trial. In one EEG
experiment, and three follow-up behavioral experiments, we
manipulated the nature of this pretarget cue. First we describe
the EEG experiment in depth, followed by our EEG measure-
ment and analysis approach. At the end of this section, we
then describe the follow-up experiments.
In the EEG experiment, the pretarget cue was a white fix-
ation cross (0.55 dva), superimposed upon the fixation point,
of variable duration. From here on we refer to this fixation
cross as the “warning signal” (WS). TheWS duration could be
either short (400 ms) or long (1,400 ms), after which the fix-
ation point reappeared for 300 ms (the “pretarget interval” or
PTI; see below), followed by the target.
Crucially, the association betweenWS duration and trial con-
gruency was determined by an experimental between-subjects
condition: 15 subjects performed the early-conflict condition, in
which 80 % of the short WSs were followed by incongruent
trials (indicating high conflict probability), and 20 % of the long
WSs were followed by incongruent trials (indicating low con-
flict probability). The other 15 subjects performed the late-
conflict condition, in which these proportions were reversed:
20 % of the short WSs were followed by incongruent trials
(low conflict probability), and 80 % of the long WSs were
followed by incongruent trials (high conflict probability). In
both conditions, the short and longWSs were presented equally
often, keeping the overall proportion of incongruent trials at
50 %, and the temporal expectation of target occurrence bal-
anced. The order of congruent and incongruent trials, together
with the order of the WSs, was pseudorandomized, such that
therewas never a repetition of the same combination ofWS, trial
type, and stimulus properties (e.g., two consecutive times an
incongruent trial with a blue circle presented on the left, preced-
ed by a 1,400-msWS). See Fig. 1a and b for an overview of the
experimental design.
The primary motivation for using a between-subjects de-
sign was to avoid transfer effects of, or switch costs between,
the learned association between WS and conflict across con-
ditions. That is, the association is opposite in the early- and
late-conflict conditions, and subjects were uninformed about
the nature of the association (see below). Moreover, the
between-subjects manipulation allowed us to increase the
number of trials per condition. Although we acknowledge
the potential limitations of a between-subjects design (i.e.,
low numbers of subjects per early-/late-conflict condition,
and possible group differences that were unaccounted for),
we believe that these do not outweigh the importance of con-
trolling for transfer effects and switch costs. Moreover, and to
foreshadow some of our results, the between-subjects factor
Group did not show interaction effects with either conflict or
conflict probability.
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2015) 15:787–807 789
The motivation for using an additional PTI of a fixed
300 ms after the WS was to temporally isolate the WS,
thereby making it more salient. Moreover, we reasoned
that the PTI would control for confounding effects of
temporal orienting (Nobre et al., 2007). That is, both after
a short WS of 400 ms and a long WS of 1,400 ms, the
target always appeared 300 ms after PTI onset. Thus, even
though conditions differed in total pretarget duration, the
PTI was meant to “reset” a temporal hazard function of
target onset (inferring the probability of target onset given
that it has not yet occurred) across all conditions. In con-
trast, uncertainty remained with respect to conflict: For
instance, after 400 ms during the long WS in the late-
conflict condition, the upcoming trial was only an incon-
gruent conflict trial in 80 % of the time. In other words,
we were interested in conflict expectation, not stimulus
occurrence expectation.
Before the start of the experiment, subjects were informed
about the different durations of the fixation cross, but not
about the association of these durations with congruency.
Subjects completed one practice block of 50 trials during
which feedback on accuracy (“Correct,” “Incorrect”) was pro-
vided upon response in each trial. In the practice block, the
temporal cues had a validity of 100 %, to enhance learning of
the cue–conflict contingencies. The main task consisted of ten
blocks of 100 trials. Between consecutive blocks, there were
self-paced breaks during which feedback on task performance
(average reaction time and accuracy) was shown on screen.
After the main task, subjects were asked whether they noticed
the duration–conflict associations, and if so, whether they had
used a particular strategy in preparing for conflict based on the
temporal cues. Although this was not assessed quantitatively,
one subject indeed noticed the association, but did not report
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Fig. 1 Task paradigm and behavioral results. (a) Trial types, stimulus
sequence, and timing (top), and examples of congruent and incongruent
trials (bottom). (b) The proportions of congruent/incongruent trials
depended on the duration of the warning signal (WS). (c) Reaction
times (RTs, left) and accuracy (right) for congruent (C) and incongruent
(I) trials as a function of previous trial congruency (top) and cued conflict
probability (bottom). Error bars represent ±1 SEM. (d) Delta plot showing
conflict effects (current trial RT incongruent – congruent) as a function of
quartiles of the RT distribution, for both low (white open circles) and high
(black solid squares) conflict probability, collapsed over groups (i.e.,
irrespective of WS duration)
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that “there was something about” the WS durations, but could
not formulate what. Yet another subject who performed in the
early-conflict condition did not notice the WS–conflict asso-
ciation in particular, but did report having used the strategy of
trying to pay more attention and respond faster when the target
came early. All other subjects explicitly reported not having
noticed the cue manipulation, nor having used any strategy.
EEG data collection and preprocessing
During this first experiment, EEG data were acquired at
512 Hz from 64 channels (using a BioSemi ActiveTwo sys-
tem; http://biosemi.com) placed according to the international
10–20 system, under and above the left eye for vertical EOG,
to the left and right sides of the left and right eyes,
respectively, for the horizontal electrooculogram (EOG), and
from both earlobes for referencing. Offline, the EEG data were
high-pass filtered at 0.5 Hz and epoched from –3.2 to 2 s,
locked to target onset. These wide ranges avoided edge arti-
facts resulting from time–frequency decomposition (see be-
low). All epochs were linearly baseline-corrected with a
200-ms pretarget baseline and visually inspected for artifacts.
Those epochs containing electromyographic or other artifacts
not related to eye blinks were manually removed, resulting in
an average of 63 rejected epochs per participant (SD = 40). On
the resulting epochs, an independent component analysis was
performed with the EEGLAB software package (Delorme &
Makeig, 2004) in MATLAB (The MathWorks). Components
related to eye blinks or artifacts in the signal that could be
clearly distinguished from brain activity were removed from
the data. On average 1.33 components (range = 1–4) were
removed. The EOG signal was included in the independent
component analysis but was left out of the further analyses.
Next, the surface Laplacian of the EEG data was estimated
(Perrin, Pernier, Bertrand, & Echallier, 1989), which is equiv-
alent to the current source density approach (Kayser & Tenke,
2006). This method has previously been applied for sharpen-
ing EEG topography and performing synchronization analy-
ses (Cavanagh et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2009; van Driel,
Ridderinkhof, & Cohen, 2012). The Laplacian accentuates
local effects while filtering out distant effects due to volume
conduction (i.e., deeper brain sources that project onto multi-
ple electrodes, thereby obscuring neurocognitively modulated
long-range functional connectivity; Oostendorp & Oosterom,
1996; Srinivasan, Winter, Ding, & Nunez, 2007; Winter,
Nunez, Ding, & Srinivasan, 2007). For estimating the surface
Laplacian, we used a 10th-order Legendre polynomial, and
lambda was set at 10–5.
EEG time–frequency decomposition
The target-locked epoched EEG time series were decomposed
into their time–frequency representations with custom-written
MATLAB scripts, by convolving them with a set of Morlet
wavelets with frequencies ranging from 1 to 50 Hz in 40
logarithmically scaled steps. These complex wavelets were
created by multiplying perfect sine waves (sine wave =
ei2πft, where i is the complex operator, f is the frequency, and
t is time) with a Gaussian (Gaussian = e–t2/2s2, where s is the
width of the Gaussian). The width of the Gaussian was set to
four cycles [s = 4/(2πf)], in order to have a good trade-off
between temporal and frequency resolution. The fast Fourier
transform (FFT) was applied to both the EEG data and the
Morlet wavelets, and these were then multiplied in the fre-
quency domain (equivalent to convolution in the time do-
main), after which the inverse FFT was applied. From the
resulting complex signal Zt (down-sampled to 40 Hz), an es-
timate of frequency-specific power at each time point was
defined as [real(Zt)
2 + imag(Zt)
2], and an estimate of the
frequency-specific phase at each time point was defined as
arctan[imag(Zt) / real(Zt)]. The trial-averaged power was deci-
bel normalized (dB Powertf = 10 * Log10[Powertf / Baseline
Powerf]), where for each channel and frequency the condition-
averaged power signal during an interval of –250 to –50 ms
relative to WS onset served as the baseline activity.
Intersite phase clustering (ISPC) measures the similarity
between pairs of channels of their time–frequency phase
values across trials. This measure of phase synchronization
is thought to reflect interregional functional connectivity
(Fries, 2005; Siegel, Donner, & Engel, 2012). ISPC is com-
puted as follows:
ISPCt f ¼ 1N 
XN
n¼1




where N is the number of trials, n is the trial number, ϕ is the
phase angle, and k and j are the two channels. ISPC can range
from 0 (no phase synchrony between channels) to 1 (identical
phase angles between channels) for each time–frequency (tf)
point. ISPC values were baseline transformed into percent
signal change (100 * [(ISPCtf – ISPCbasef) / ISPCbasef]),
using the same baseline time window as for trial-averaged
power. We used a condition-specific baseline for ISPC in or-
der to control for spurious results induced by differences in the
number of trials for the different trial types. Time–frequency
decomposition was performed both target-locked and
response-locked (i.e., the time series of each EEG epoch were
re-sorted to be time-locked to the buttonpress).
Electrodes, frequency bands, and time windows of interest
To a priori select channels and time–frequency windows of
interest for further statistical analyses, we took the following
approach: First, we computed condition-average (i.e., averag-
ing over groups, congruencies, and conflict probabilities)
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topographical maps of response-locked theta (3–8 Hz) power,
for several time points around the response. This revealed a
clear locus of theta activity around electrodes Cz and FCz;
these electrodes were pooled as one midfrontal electrode pair.
Next, we computed a condition-average time–frequency map
of this midfrontal region, which revealed a clear “hotspot” of
theta-band (3- to 8-Hz) activity from –200 to 100 ms relative
to the response, which we selected as our main time–frequen-
cy window of interest (see Fig. 2a and b). Note that because of
condition averaging, this selection procedure was orthogonal
to, and thus not biased by, potential condition differences be-
tween (1) congruent or incongruent trials, (2) the conflict
probability conditions, and (3) interactions between these
factors.
For ISPC analyses, the midfrontal electrodes FCz/Cz now
served as “seeds” of targeted synchronization in the theta
band. First, we plotted a condition-averaged topographical
map of ISPC over the same time–frequency window as used
for the power analysis. This revealed two bilateral regions of
interest of functional connectivity with our midfrontal elec-
trode pair: one over lateral frontal sites (AF3/AF4), and one
over lateral parieto-occipital sites (CP5/CP6). Subsequent
time–frequency maps of ISPC between these two target re-
gions and the midfrontal region indeed showed strong con-
nectivity in the theta frequency band around the time of the
response (Fig. 3a). Importantly, the selection procedure of
target electrodes for this seeded-synchrony analysis was data
driven, and unbiased because of our condition-averaging ap-
proach (see above). Although interregional connectivity could
be expected, given the communicative cognitive control sig-
nals between, for example, MFC and DLPFC (see the intro-
duction), the exact electrodes were determined through this
approach.
In addition to reactive (i.e., response-locked) control mech-
anisms, we were also interested in cue-related, proactive (i.e.,
during the WS/PTI) control processes. To this end, we used
the same frequency band (3–8 Hz) and electrode pair (FCz/
Cz) as for the response-locked power analysis, and looked for
pretarget dynamics of theta power during the WS and the PTI.
We reasoned that during the first 400 ms of either the short or
the longWS, subjects could not infer its predictive value. This
t ime window could thus always be regarded as
noninformative. The PTI, on the other hand, could always
be regarded as an informative time window: After WS offset
(irrespective of whether this was after 400 or 1,400 ms), sub-
jects could infer whether conflict probability was high or low.
The interval from 400 to 1,400 ms after WS onset provided
only for the long-WS trials an informative cue about conflict
probability, as well: For the late-conflict group, a long WS
cued high conflict probability, whereas for the early-conflict
group, a long WS cued low conflict probability. Importantly,
evaluating the effect of conflict probability during this infor-
mative time window of the long-WS trials was by definition a
between-group comparison. First, we computed the average
midfrontal theta-band activity over these three time windows
(0–400, 400–1,400, and 1,400–1,700 ms relative to WS on-
set), separately for high and low conflict probability. Second,
as an exploratory analysis, we additionally plotted separate
midfrontal time–frequency maps of the short- and long-WS
trials, averaged over the two groups and thereby over cued
conflict probability, to identify different time–frequency win-
dows of interest (Fig. 4a). On the basis of these plots, we
computed the average activity in the alpha (8–14 Hz) and beta
(15–25 Hz) frequency bands during the same noninformative,
informative, and PTI time windows, and performed the same
statistical analysis (see below) as for theta activity.
Finally, we tested whether cued conflict probability could
have an effect on spatial attention toward the stimulus loca-
tion, since this was the conflicting dimension in the Simon
task. Spatial attention has been shown to elicit posterior alpha
(8–14 Hz) suppression contralateral to the attended hemifield
(Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut, Nietzel, Brandt, & Pascual-Leone,
2006). Thus, we analyzed epochs on the basis of presentation
side (left/right), conflict probability (high/low), and target
congruency (congruent/incongruent). Topographical maps of
alpha-band power at several posttarget time windows revealed
a clear decrease in alpha activity at electrodes PO7/O1 for
right-presented stimuli, and PO8/O2 for left-presented stimuli
(Fig. 5a). Time–frequency maps of contralateral minus ipsilat-
eral activity of these channels (i.e., the average of PO7/O1 –
PO8/O2 for right stimuli, and PO8/O2 – PO7/O1 for left stim-
uli, collapsed across conflict probability and congruency) con-
firmed this alpha suppression effect to be present during a
270- to 550-ms window (Fig. 5b). Lateral alpha power was
thus defined as the average power at these posterior channels
and time–frequency window.
Statistical analyses
The aim of our analyses were (1) to test whether the temporal
cue could be used to reduce the conflict effect, and (2) to
assess whether conflict-related theta-band activity, reflecting
control processes (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Cohen, 2014),
would already have commenced during the conflict-predicting
intervals, thus not exclusively being present during the time of
the response.We therefore analyzed both behavior (as reaction
times [RTs] and accuracy) and brain activity (power and
ISPC) using repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with the within-subjects factors of interest
Current Trial Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and
Conflict Probability (high vs. low). Since the target congruen-
cy of a previous trial has been shown to influence behavior on
a current trial (e.g., Egner, 2007; Gratton et al., 1992; Kerns
et al., 2004), we also included Previous Trial Congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent) as a factor, to account for con-
founding influences of previous congruency. Furthermore,
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although we were not interested in a possible effect of WS
duration, per se, we included the between-subjects factor
Group as well, so that possible group differences or interac-
tions would indicate stronger temporal-cueing effects for lon-
ger or shorter WS durations. In all ANOVAs, when the as-
sumption of sphericity did not hold, the Greenhouse–Geisser
correction was applied, although we report the original de-
grees of freedom for ease of interpretation. Post-hoc depen-
dent-samples t tests were performed to explore any interaction
effects. Error and posterror trials were excluded from all anal-
yses, except for the behavioral analysis of accuracy. For brain
activity, we computed power and ISPC for each subject aver-
aged over the time–frequency windows and electrodes, as
specified above.
In the pretarget analysis, we conducted a separate
independent-samples t test for activity during the informative
window of the long WS, in which the late- and early-conflict
groups were directly compared, reflecting a comparison of
high and low conflict probability, respectively. In the posterior
alpha lateralization analysis, we used a repeated measures
ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Laterality (contra
vs. ipsi), Conflict Probability (high vs. low), and Current
Trial Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), and the
between-subjects factor Group.
To assess the relation between our behavioral and electro-
physiological effects, we performed Spearman rank-
correlation tests. For the correlations, a single measure was
computed for the difference in the conflict effects (incongru-
ent [I] minus congruent [C]) induced by conflict probability
(conflict-cueing effect): (I – C)high – (I – C)low. This measure
was computed for RTs, power, and ISPC (for the RT analysis,
within-subjects standardized RTs were used in order to make
the measure more comparable between subjects; for power
and ISPC, the decibel and percent change corrected values
were used, respectively). On the basis of the previous litera-
ture (Cohen & Donner, 2013; Cohen & Ridderinkhof, 2013),
we expected to find positive correlations, and thus set the
statistical test of significant correlation to be one-tailed.
Finally, to evaluate the time course of one of our significant
ANOVA effects of EEG power (see below), we performed
time-wise permutation testing with cluster-based thresholding,
as a correction for multiple comparisons. Specifically, the per-
mutation test transformed the average condition difference
power value at each time point from decibels into a z value
with respect to a null distribution of surrogate condition dif-
ference values, obtained by swapping condition labels for a
random half of subjects at each of 1,000 permutations. The
resulting z scores were thresholded at p < .05. With an addi-
tional 1,000-iteration permutation test, a distribution of cluster
sizes of contiguous significant time points under the null hy-
pothesis of no condition difference was computed, and only
clusters that exceeded the 95th percentile of this distribution
were retained.
Single-trial regression analysis
The above-described analyses were all performed on the basis
of trial-averaged data. Additionally, it would be revealing to
take into account within-subjects intertrial variability (Cohen
& Cavanagh, 2011; Pernet, Sajda, & Rousselet, 2011): In this
way, one could more readily infer that proactive control trig-
gered by conflict-predicting time intervals, and reactive con-
trol triggered by actual conflict, are dynamic, single-trial adap-
tive processes. To this end, we assessed whether the online
neural dynamics directly reflected (i) anticipated conflict dur-
ing the conflict-predicting intervals, (ii) experienced conflict
at time of the target, and (iii) the validity of the conflict ex-
pectation at the time of the target.
First, we computed, for each subject, single-trial midfrontal
theta power, averaged over three time windows: the PTI (–
300 ms to target onset) as the conflict-predicting interval, the
response-related interval (–200 to 100 ms, response-locked),
and the noninformative time window (0–400 ms post-WS-
onset) as a control interval. Second, we determined the trial-
type labels: Each trial had a WS that predicted either low or
high conflict probability, a target that was either congruent or
incongruent, and the predictive cue could either match (e.g.,
high conflict probability followed by an incongruent trial) or
not match (e.g., high conflict probability followed by a con-
gruent trial) the eventual level of conflict. Next, we tested
whether single-trial pretarget and response-related theta power
was a reliable predictor of these trial-type labels. For each
subject, we fitted three logistic regression models for the av-
erage single-trial power values of the three different time win-
dows. In turn, each resulting β term consisted (in addition to
the intercept) of three regression weights that corresponded to
the degree to which theta power predicted each trial-type la-
bel. For each subject, these regression weights were binarized
as 1 if the regression weight indicated that increased theta
power over trials predicted a high-conflict-probability cue,
an incongruent trial, or a match between cue and congruency,
and as 0 if increased theta power predicted a low-conflict-
probability cue, a congruent trial, or a nonmatch between
cue and congruency. The regression weights were tested at
the group level against .5 (reflecting chance-level predictive
value of the binarized regression weights) using one-sample
Mann–Whitney U (also known as the Wilcoxon rank sum)
nonparametric t tests, which were considered significant if
they exceeded a Bonferroni-corrected threshold of p < .0167
(i.e., .05 divided by the three time windows tested). See Cohen
and Donner (2013) for a more detailed description of this
approach. The rationale behind the binary recoding of regres-
sion weights was that because condition labels are binary, a
continuous beta weight of theta power predicting such a bina-
ry variable would be less intuitive. We confirmed that repeat-
ing the analyses with continuous regression weights led to the
same pattern of results.
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Follow-up behavioral experiments
To assess whether the effects of the temporal cues extended to
nontemporal cues, we conducted three additional behavioral
(no EEG) experiments. The tasks and procedures were iden-
tical to those of the EEG experiment, apart from the type of
cue used. All of the task parameters and statistical analyses of
behavioral performance were in line with those from the EEG
experiment, except where noted.
Follow-up Experiment 1: nontemporal implicit cueing In
this experiment, the cue consisted of a horizontal black bar
(height 0.25 dva) presented at fixation. The cue duration was
always 900 ms (i.e., the average of the 400- and 1,400-msWS
durations in the EEG experiment), and was followed by the
PTI and target. Crucially, the width of the horizontal bar cue
was either 0.5 or 1.26 dva. In the short-conflict condition, a
short (vs. long) horizontal bar predicted the upcoming trial to
be incongruent (vs. congruent) with 80% validity. In the long-
conflict condition, the cues had the opposite meanings.
Randomly, ten subjects were assigned to the short-conflict
condition, and the other ten were assigned to the long-
conflict condition. The rationale behind this experiment was
that the width (spatial length) of the bar should be analogous
to the duration (temporal length) of the WS from the EEG
experiment, in serving as a cue. However, here the prediction
of the cue could be inferred upon its presentation (because the
difference in width could be instantaneously perceived),
whereas in the EEG experiment this could only be inferred
after a certain time had passed (because the WS was percep-
tually identical in all trials, except for its duration).
Follow-up Experiment 2: probabilistic semantic cueing In
this experiment, the task was identical to the task of the first
follow-up experiment, except that we used the semantically
meaningful words “HARD” and “EASY” as the conflict-
predicting cues (with the same 80 % validity), instead of the
horizontal bars. These cues allowed for a complete within-
subjects design (i.e., no Group factor was needed to counter-
balance the cue-probability mapping across subjects). This
experiment started with two practice blocks: a noncue version
of the Simon task (with an intertrial interval of 1,000 ms) of 25
trials, and a 100%-validity practice block of 25 trials using the
word cues. The experiment consisted of six blocks of 100
trials each, separated by self-paced breaks.
Follow-up Experiment 3: informative versus uninforma-
tive cueing In this experiment, the task was identical to the
task of the second follow-up experiment, except for the cue
validity and the inclusion of a neutral cue. Here, the word
“HARD” was always followed by an incongruent trial, the
word “EASY” was always followed by a congruent trial, and
the word “NEUTRAL” was followed 50 % of the time apiece
by an incongruent and by a congruent trial. Because the infor-
mative cues were 100 % valid in this experiment, this design
allowed for a comparison of the conflict effects following the
informative cues versus following a neutral, uninformative cue.
Thus, in this experiment the factor Cue Type had the two levels
informative versus uninformative, instead of high versus low
conflict probability as in the other experiments.
Results
Behavioral results from EEG experiment
On average, the subjects responded correctly on 92.76 % (SD
= 3.04) of the trials, with an average response speed of
467.40 ms (SD = 57.12). On correct trials (also excluding
posterror trials), RTs increased significantly on incongruent
as compared to congruent trials [F(1, 28) = 32.56, p < .001],
reflecting the classic conflict effect induced by the irrelevant
spatial dimension of the stimulus. In addition, we found a
significant interaction between current and previous trial con-
gruency [F(1, 28) = 26.92, p < .001]. As can be seen in Fig. 1c
(upper panel), the conflict effect on RTs decreased when the
preceding trial was incongruent [t(29) = 1.32, p = .12], relative
to when it was congruent [t(29) = 7.18, p < .001]. This repli-
cates earlier findings of the congruency sequence effect
(Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010; Gratton et al., 1992). Both
the conflict effect and the conflict sequence effect were pres-
ent in accuracy, as well: Subjects performed worse on incon-
gruent than on congruent trials [F(1, 28) = 8.74, p = .006], and
this decrease in performance was attenuated when the previ-
ous trial was incongruent [F(1, 28) = 11.88, p = .002].
Importantly, our manipulation of pretarget conflict cueing
based on temporal information showed an unexpected finding
(Fig. 1c, lower panel). When the WS duration predicted high
conflict probability, the conflict effect on RTs increased, as
compared to when the WS duration predicted low conflict
probability [F(1, 28) = 32.56, p < .001]. For accuracy, we
found a similar, though nonsignificant, effect [F(1, 28) =
3.78, p = .062]. Moreover, these effects did not depend on
whether the subjects performed the early- or the late-conflict
condition, as is indicated by the absence of an interaction with
the between-subjects factor Group [RT: F(1, 28) = 3.23, p =
.083; accuracy: F < 1]. In other words, when conflict could be
anticipated on the basis of the duration of a fixation cross
(irrespective of whether this predicting interval was short or
long), this hampered conflict resolution.
We further explored this negative effect of cueing on con-
flict by examining RT distributions through delta plots, in
which the conflict effect (the difference in RTs between incon-
gruent and congruent trials) is plotted as a function of average
RT. This approach has been shown to be sensitive to variations
and dynamics in conflict effects that are otherwise lost in
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regular trial-average scores (Ridderinkhof, 2002; van den
Wildenberg et al., 2010). Figure 1d shows that throughout
the RT distribution, the conflict effect was stronger for high-
than for low-conflict-probability cueing [Congruency ×
Conflict Probability interaction, F(1, 29) = 24.0, p < .001].
Irrespective of conflict probability, on the other hand, the con-
flict effect became reduced with longer RTs [Congruency ×
RTBin interaction:F(3, 27) = 75.95, p < .001], as is evidenced
by a negative slope of the delta plot [F(1, 29) = 142.4, p <
.001], which is consistent with previous reports of the Simon
task and is interpreted as the selective suppression of location-
based response capture (Burle, van den Wildenberg, &
Ridderinkhof, 2005; Ridderinkhof, 2002). Since congruency,
RT bin, and conflict probability did not interact [F(3, 27) =
1.99, p = .16], selective suppression was not influenced by the
temporal cueing of conflict.
The effect of conflict probability on current trial congruen-
cy did not further interact with previous trial congruency,
which suggests that the mechanism that was driving the
conflict-cueing effect was different from the mechanism that
mediated conflict adaptation (Alpay et al., 2009; Egner, 2007).
This is an important finding, because conflict adaptation, as
reflected by the CSE, can be considered a form of anticipatory
control, as well (see the introduction). Furthermore, we ob-
served nomain effect of conflict probability, and in general the
two groups did not differ in RTs (all Fs < 1). The early-conflict
group did perform better than the late-conflict group in terms
of accuracy [F(1, 28) = 4.62, p = .04]. An additional analysis
of the possible influence of the WS duration of the preceding
trial on the RT at the current trial showed that there was no
main effect of current and previous trial WS duration (all Fs <
1), nor an interaction between these factors [F(1, 28) = 1.96, p
= .17], signifying that our manipulation of different WS dura-
tions, which resulted in different intervals between successive
targets, did not affect general, nonspecific preparation to re-
spond to these targets (Los & Agter, 2005).
Together, these behavioral dynamics point to an effect of
conflict cueing that is opposite from what has been reported
previously (Wendt & Kiesel, 2011): When the probability of
conflict could be inferred on the basis of temporal informa-
tion, behavioral responses to conflict further deteriorated.
Response-related EEG time–frequency power
On the basis of a condition-orthogonal contrast of response-
related oscillatory power against baseline, we chose a two-
channel (FCz and Cz) midfrontal pair of electrodes for our main
analyses (see theMaterials and method section). As is shown in
Fig. 2a and b, this electrode pair showed an increase in activity
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Fig. 2 Response-locked oscillatory power results. (a) Condition average
(top) and conflict-related (bottom) topographical maps of theta (3–8 Hz)
power, revealing a midfrontal (FCz/Cz) hotspot of activity. cI, incongru-
ent trial preceded by congruent trial; cC, congruent trial preceded by
congruent trial. Black-and-white disks denote the electrodes plotted in
panel b. (b) Time–frequency maps at the electrodes highlighted in panel
a (pooled), showing condition average (left) as well as conflict-related
(right) activity in theta power around the response. The black-outlined
squares show the time–frequency window of interest used for the
ANOVA. (c) Average midfrontal theta activity in the time window of
interest for congruent (C) and incongruent (I) trials as a function of pre-
vious trial congruency (left) and the cued conflict probability (right).
Error bars represent ±1 SEM. (d) Conflict-related (I–C) midfrontal theta
power plotted over time for high (top curve) and low (bottom curve) cued
conflict probability. The vertical dashed lines denote the ANOVA time
window selected in panel b. Shaded area = ±1 SEM
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100 ms surrounding the buttonpress. Average activity in this
time–frequency window concurred with our behavioral find-
ings described above (Fig. 2c). First, we found a conflict-
related (i.e., I – C) increase in midfrontal theta power [F(1,
28) = 26.39, p < .001], which was stronger when the previous
trial was congruent than when it was incongruent [F(1, 28) =
20.75, p < .001], corroborating previous findings (e.g., Cohen
& Donner, 2013; Pastötter, Dreisbach, & Bäuml, 2013).
Second, the midfrontal conflict-related theta power was modu-
lated by conflict probability [F(1, 28) = 10.82, p = .003], inde-
pendent of previous trial congruency (F < 1): Conflict-related
theta power was stronger after high than after low conflict prob-
ability, mimicking the (unexpected) behavioral cueing effect.
Indeed, the cueing effect on theta power correlated across
subjects with the cueing effect on behavior (Fig. 6a): Subjects
who exhibited more conflict-related behavioral slowing after a
high- than after a low-conflict-probability cue also showed a
stronger conflict-related increase in midfrontal theta power
after a high- than after a low-conflict-probability cue (r =
.31, p = .049 [r = .39, p = .020 when excluding one marked
outlier]). Interestingly, this cross-subject correlation seemed to
be driven mostly by the effect of conflict probability on con-
gruent trials (r = .33, p = .037 [r = .38, p = .024, when ex-
cluding the earlier outlier]), and less on incongruent trials (r =
.26, p = .084 [r = .25, p = .097, when excluding the outlier]).
No further interaction effects with group occurred, nor any
main effects of conflict probability or (previous trial) WS du-
ration (all ps > .1). Thus, in line with the behavioral findings,
temporal cueing of conflict showed a specific effect of in-
creased local conflict-related theta-power dynamics, again in-
dependent from the actual duration of the cue.
Because we restricted this analysis to an a-priori-chosen
time window, we next explored the time course of this effect,
which is illustrated in the line plot in Fig. 2d. The effect of
current trial congruency on midfrontal theta clearly dropped
to zero before and after the response. However, over a longer
time window of –500 to 50 ms around the response, conflict-
related theta power was significantly elevated when high con-
flict probability rather than low conflict probability was cued
(as revealed by time-wise permutation testing with cluster-size
thresholding). Thus, the modulation of conflict-related
midfrontal theta power by conflict cueing was already present
around target onset, and may even have extended to a pretarget
time window (average RTs were below 500 ms). A pretarget
conflict-related effect may seem odd, given that actual conflict
is not yet known, but careful inspection of Fig. 2d shows that
around this time, the two lines that are separated on the basis of
cued conflict probability together average out to zero. Thus,
this preresponse—and possibly pretarget—effect is most likely












































FCz/CZ – AF3/AF4 FCz/CZ – CP5/CP6Theta (3-8 Hz)a
b
Fig. 3 Response-locked intersite phase clustering (ISPC) results. (a) To-
pographical map of condition-averaged midfrontal-seeded theta ISPC
(middle), revealing connectivity between midfrontal and lateral prefrontal
(AF3/AF4, left) sites and posterior (CP5/CP6, right) sites around the
response. The outline box on the left and the top electrode disks in the
map denote the time–frequency–space selection for lateral frontal con-
nectivity; the box on the right and the bottom electrode disks denote time–
frequency–space selection for posterior connectivity. The black disks in
map depict the seed region of midfrontal FCz/Cz sites. (b) Average theta
ISPC in the timewindows denoted in panel a (as indicated by the arrows),
plotted for congruent (c) and incongruent (I) trials as a function of cued
conflict probability, for the respective target regions (left, AF3/AF4; right,
CP5/CP6) showing connectivity with the midfrontal seed region. Error
bars represent ±1 SEM
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interpretation was confirmed below (see the Cue-related
pretarget EEG time–frequency power section).
Response-related intersite phase clustering
In addition, we were interested in whether conflict cueing
modulated interregional connectivity, as well. To test this,
we computed intersite phase clustering (ISPC; see the
Materials and method section) between the midfrontal elec-
trode pair used for the power analysis (here, thus, used as
“seed”) and all other electrodes, which revealed theta-band
synchronization between this region and a bilateral prefrontal
region (AF3/AF4), as well as a bilateral centro-parietal region
(CP5/CP6; see Fig. 3a). Importantly, the selection of these elec-
trodes was data driven and unbiased, because this selection was
orthogonal to potential condition differences. Although
midfrontal connectivity with lateral prefrontal electrodes could
be expected on the basis of earlier findings (e.g., Cohen &
Cavanagh, 2011), the finding of midfrontal–centro-parietal
connectivity was not hypothesized a priori. Using the same
time–frequency windows that were used for the power analy-
sis, a similar repeated measures ANOVA revealed a marginal
effect of current trial congruency for the lateral prefrontal re-
gion only [F(1, 28) = 4.11, p = .052; centro-parietal: F(1, 28) =
1.36, p = .25], where incongruent trials elicited stronger ISPC
than congruent trials. Previous and current congruency did not
further interact [lateral prefrontal: F(1, 28) = 2.04, p = .17;
centro-parietal approaching significance: F(1, 28) = 3.79, p =
.062].
However, we observed a strong interaction between con-
flict probability and current trial congruency [lateral prefron-
tal: F(1, 28) = 66.17, p < .001; centro-parietal: F(1, 28) =
95.19, p < .001; Fig. 3b], which, as in the power and behav-
ioral results, did not interact with group (F < 1). Moreover,
whereas a cue predicting high conflict probability was follow-
ed by stronger ISPC for incongruent than for congruent trials
[lateral prefrontal: t(29) = 7.00, p < .001; centro-parietal: t(29)
= 6.89, p < .001], a cue predicting low conflict probability was
followed by a reverse effect, of stronger ISPC after congruent
than after incongruent trials [lateral prefrontal: t(29) = 4.77, p
< .001; centro-parietal: t(29) = 5.93, p < .001]. This could not
be attributed to differences in trial number, because ISPC
values tend to be higher for low trial counts, whereas we found
the reverse pattern.
Similar to the power results, the cueing effect on centro-
parietal (FCz/Cz–CP5/CP6) theta-band connectivity correlat-
ed with the cueing effect on behavior (Fig. 6b): Subjects that
showed stronger conflict-related RT slowing after a high- than
after a low-conflict-probability cue also showed a stronger
conflict-related increase in theta ISPC after a high- than after
a low-conflict-probability cue (r = .33, p = .036). Again, as
with power, this correlation was stronger in degree when con-
sidering only congruent trials (r = .48, p < .004), and was
absent for incongruent trials (r = –.04, p = .59). The theta
ISPC between midfrontal and lateral prefrontal regions
(AF3/AF4) showed no significant correlations (all ps > .1).
Cue-related pretarget EEG time–frequency power
The results above provide evidence that the conflict-predicting
temporal cue affected both behavioral performance and the
associated brain dynamics, though in the opposite direction
from the one expected. To examine whether this could be
explained by changes in pretarget cue-related activity, we plot-
ted time–frequency power locked to the WS onset, for both
short- and long-WS trials, collapsed over groups (i.e., aver-
aged over conflict probability). As can be seen in Fig. 4a, this
revealed modulations in the theta, alpha (8–14 Hz), and beta

































































Fig. 4 Cue-locked pretarget power results. (a) Condition-average time–
frequency maps of midfrontal power, plotted separately for short-
warning-signal (WS; top) and long-WS (bottom) trials. Activity is plotted
separately for the pretarget (left; time relative toWS onset) and posttarget
(right; time relative to target onset) periods due to scaling differences.
Vertical dashed lines demarcate the time windows of interest, reflecting
short- and long-WS onset and offset, target onset, and average RT. (b) Bar
plot of average midfrontal theta power during three time windows of
interest, separately for high and low cued conflict probability in the
noninformative window (0–400 ms post-WS), informative window
(400–1,400 ms post-WS; long-WS trials only), and pretarget interval
(–300 to 0 ms pretarget). Error bars represent ±1 SEM
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neural measure of conflict anticipation, because of a possible
modulation of activity between cue and target, as a function of
conflict probability.
To test this, we first restricted our analysis to the theta band,
and computed midfrontal theta power in three time windows
of interest: the first 400ms over both short- and long-WS trials
(the “noninformative” time window), 400–1,400 ms for long-
WS trials only (the “informative” time window), and the PTI
for both short- and long-WS trials (see the Materials and
method section for the rationale behind these time window
labels). As expected, during the noninformative window,
midfrontal theta power did not differ between the high- and
low-conflict probability conditions [F(1, 28) = 0.96, p = .33],
nor did it interact with group [F(1, 28) = 0.12, p = .74].
However, during the informative window, subjects for whom
the longWS predicted high conflict probability showed stron-
ger midfrontal theta activity than did subjects for whom the
long WS predicted low conflict probability [t(29) = 2.38, p =
.024]. During the subsequent PTI, this difference between
high and low conflict probability persisted, for both short
and long WSs [i.e., a main effect of conflict probability: F(1,
28) = 4.91, p = .035, without an interaction with group, F <
0.1]. Thus, pretarget midfrontal oscillatory dynamics showed
a preparatory effect of conflict cueing with a hazard function
characteristic: When the conditional probability of conflict
increased (vs. decreased) over time, given that the WS had
not yet ended,midfrontal theta power concomitantly increased
(vs. decreased).
Second, we explored alpha- and beta-band power, because
the condition-averaged time–frequency maps of long and
short WS also showed activity in these bands (see Fig. 4a).
During the same time windows used for the theta-band anal-
ysis, alpha power was not modulated by any of our factors, nor
by their interactions (all ps > .1). However, beta power
showed an interaction between conflict probability and group
during the PTI [F(1, 28) = 4.39, p = .048], in which a post-hoc
independent-samples t test revealed that after a low-conflict-
probability cue, beta suppression was stronger for the early-
conflict group than for the late-conflict group [t(28) = 2.54, p
= .017]. That is, beta suppression was stronger after a longWS
than after a short WS, because the long WS was a low-
conflict-probability cue for the early-conflict group, and the
short WS was a low-conflict-probability cue for the late-
conflict group. This result can be explained by an effect of
duration on beta suppression, which typically develops in
strength over time when preparing for a motor response (de
Jong, Gladwin, & ’t Hart, 2006). Interestingly, this effect was
absent when both a short and a long WS indicated a high
probability of conflict [t(28) = 1.51, p = .14].
In sum, these results provide evidence for a neural signa-
ture of conflict anticipation (increase in pretarget midfrontal
theta power), triggered by temporal cues that predict conflict.































































Fig. 5 Stimulus-locked alpha lateralization results. (a) Topographical
maps of alpha (8–14 Hz) power 300–600 ms poststimulus, plotted
separately for stimuli presented to the left and right of fixation, showing
contralateral posterior alpha suppression. The black-and-white disks de-
note the electrode selection for further analysis: PO8/O2 for left stimuli,
and PO7/O1 for right stimuli. (b) Time–frequency map of contralateral
minus ipsilateral activity (averaged over left and right stimuli),
confirming modulation in alpha-band activity as a function of stimulus
location. The white-line box denotes time–frequency window used for the
ANOVA. (c) Bar plots of ipsilateral (light gray), contralateral (dark gray),
and contralateral–ipsilateral (lined) posterior alpha power. (d) Average
power of the time–frequency window denoted in panel b, plotted for
congruent (C) and incongruent (I) trials as a function of cued conflict
probability. Error bars represent ±1 SEM
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Within-subjects single-trial regression
Conflict anticipation triggered by conflict-predicting time in-
tervals, and reactive control triggered by actual conflict,
should manifest at the single-trial level. We hypothesized that
the degree of midfrontal theta power would fluctuate over the
course of the trial, depending on whether (i) the temporal cue
predicted conflict, (ii) the trial subsequently contained a con-
flict target, and (iii) the prediction of the cue was valid. To this
end, we performed a logistic regression analysis (see the
Materials and method section), in which we used single-trial
midfrontal theta power averaged over three time windows (the
noninformative window, the PTI [see Fig. 4b], and the
response-related window used for the general power analysis
[see Fig. 2b]) to predict these condition labels. The results are
shown in Fig. 7, where on the y-axis the percentage of subjects
is shown who exhibited a positive relationship between theta
and the condition label. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test
corroborated the trial-averaged group-level results. First, theta
activity during the noninformative window remained at the
chance prediction level (all ps > .4). Second, during the PTI,
theta power predicted the type of cue (p = .011), where stron-
ger theta was associated with high-conflict-probability cues.
Finally, during the response-related window, theta power pre-
dicted the actual congruency (p < .001), where stronger theta
power was associated with incongruent trials. Interestingly,
stronger response-related theta was also predictive of the
cue–congruency match (p = .001), reflecting at the single-
trial level the group-level interaction between conflict proba-
bility and current trial congruency described above. For ex-
ample, when a high-conflict-probability cue was followed by
an incongruent trial, such a trial was likely to result in stronger
theta activity; and similarly, a low-conflict-probability cue
followed by a congruent trial was also likely to result in stron-
ger theta.
In sum, this analysis revealed evidence of single-trial con-
flict anticipation based on temporal information, expressed in
midfrontal theta-band activity. Moreover, the single-trial ac-
tivity corroborated the seemingly contradictory cueing effect
around the response, of increased conflict-related midfrontal
theta power when this conflict could be anticipated.
Target-related lateralized alpha
We next tested whether the cueing of conflict could have af-
fected low-level processing of stimulus features as well. In the
Simon task, the feature that is of particular interest is the target
location, as this is the irrelevant dimension that leads to
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Fig. 6 Cross-subject correlations. (a) Subject-specific average
midfrontal (FCz/Cz) theta power (from theANOVA for the time–frequen-
cy window; see Fig. 2a and b), as a function of the subject-specific RT.
Left: Correlation of conflict-related difference scores (I–C), modulated by
cued conflict probability (high–low). The black-bordered gray disk de-
picts one outlier subject. Right: Correlations of congruent (top) and in-
congruent (bottom), modulated by cued conflict probability (high–low).
The same outlier subject is highlighted, as in the left plot. (b) Same as in



































MF Theta single-trial regression
chance
Fig. 7 Single-trial midfrontal theta regression results. Plotted are subject-
average binary beta weights (0 = negative prediction, 1 = positive predic-
tion) as a function of time window, shown separately for the trial-type
predictors conflict probability, congruency, and their interaction. Regres-
sion models including these three predictors were fitted per time window,
on the single-trial midfrontal theta power averaged over the respective
time window. The gray dotted horizontal line denotes chance prediction
by the model. Colored asterisks denote significant regressions between
single-trial theta and trial type (Wilcoxon rank sum t tests, p < .017)
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response conflict. We reasoned that posterior alpha suppres-
sion contralateral to side of stimulus presentation would be a
strong correlate of lateralized attentional processing (Sauseng
et al., 2005; Thut et al., 2006). The spatial location of the
stimulus indeed elicited a strong contralateral alpha suppres-
sion over parieto-occipital regions [F(1, 28) = 39.70, p <
.001], around 300 ms after target onset. This means that, for
example, when a stimulus was presented on the left side of the
screen, alpha power suppression was relatively stronger over
right parieto-occipital sites than over left parieto-occipital sites
(see Fig. 5a–c) This alpha lateralization effect was modulated
by current trial congruency [F(1, 28) = 15.43, p = .001], in
which congruent trials elicited stronger alpha lateralization
than incongruent trials [t(29) = 3.67, p = .001; Fig. 5d].
However, conflict probability did not interact with stimulus
location (F < 1), nor was there a three-way interaction be-
tween conflict probability, current trial congruency, and stim-
ulus location (F < 1). Importantly, these null findings suggest
that cueing conflict did not affect bottom-up processing of
sensory features, as it did not modulate a neural index of
spatial attention (Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut et al., 2006). On
the other hand, these results do show how spatial attention was
reduced (as indicated by relatively less lateralized alpha power
suppression) after targets of which the spatial location was
incongruent with the required response. Given the absence
of an effect of cueing, however, this spatial attention effect
could be regarded reactive rather than proactive.
Behavioral results of follow-up experiments
We set out to further pin down this surprising finding by
means of three follow-up experiments, in which we varied
the symbolic and probabilistic nature of the cues (see
Materials and method above) in the same Simon task.
Follow-Up Experiment 1: nontemporal cueing In short,
this task was identical to the temporal-cueing task, except that
the cues consisted of horizontal bars of equal duration, with the
width forming a cue for conflict probability. As expected, this
task resulted in slower responses on incongruent than on con-
gruent trials [F(1, 18) = 22.79, p < .001], and this conflict effect
was reduced when the previous trial was incongruent as com-
pared to when it was congruent [F(1, 18) = 42.98, p < .001].
The same pattern was found for accuracy (both ps < .05).
Importantly, this task elicited the same contradictory effect
of conflict cueing [F(1, 18) = 4.64, p = .045; Fig. 8a]. Similar
to the manipulation of time intervals as cues, when the non-
temporal symbolic information (i.e., the width of a bar) cued
high conflict probability, the conflict effect in RTs increased,
as compared to when the cued conflict probability was low
[t(19) = 2.09, p = .050]. Again, this effect did not interact with
group [F(1, 18) = 2.22, p = .15], nor with previous trial con-
gruency (F < 1). For accuracy, we did not observe an interac-
tion between the current trial congruency and conflict proba-



























































































Fig. 8 Behavioral results of the follow-up experiments. In all plots, RTs
and accuracy are shown for congruent (C) and incongruent (I) targets at
the current trial as a function the cue. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. (a)
Spatial cueing with horizontal bars predicting low (20 %) or high (80 %)
conflict probability, depending on spatial length. (b) Semantic cueing, in
which the words BEASY^ and BHARD^ predicted low (20 %) or high
(80 %) conflict probability. (c) Here the semantic cues were 100 % valid,
as compared with a neutral cue (the word BNEUTRAL^) that was 50 %
valid
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Follow-Up Experiment 2: probabilistic semantic
cueing To investigate whether the symbolic nature of the
cue is an important variable in the results above, we repeated
the same experiment, except that the cues comprised words
that were semantically informative about conflict (e.g.,
“HARD”), while still predicting conflict with 80 % certainty.
Although we found the same general conflict and sequence
effects (all ps < .05), any effect of cueing was absent. That is,
no main effect of conflict probability emerged [RT: F(1, 14) =
1.36, p = .26; accuracy: F < 1], nor any interaction with cur-
rent and previous trial congruency (all Fs < 1; Fig. 8b).
Follow-Up Experiment 3: informative versus uninforma-
tive cueing Introducing an uninformative cue (the word
“NEUTRAL”) that predicted conflict with 50 % probability,
together with the “HARD” and “EASY” words, which now
predicted the upcoming congruency as informative cues, with
100 % validity, showed a pattern of results that replicated
earlier findings (Strack et al., 2013). First, subjects responded
faster [F(1, 14) = 22.88, p < .001] and more accurately [F(1,
14) = 9.60, p = .008] when the cues were informative than
when they were uninformative (Fig. 8c). Second, the conflict
effect for RTs was higher following informative than follow-
ing uninformative cues [t(14) = 3.58, p = .003], which was
reflected by an interaction between the factors Cue Type and
Current Trial Congruency [F(1, 14) = 12.80, p = .003]. In
other words, people benefited from the informativeness, or
validity, of the cue in preparing for incongruent trials [t(14)
= 3.91, p = .002], but this effect was even stronger when
preparing for congruent trials [t(14) = 5.12, p < .001]. These
interactions were not present for accuracy (all Fs < 1).
Discussion
In this study, we hypothesized that if temporal information
derived from between-trial intervals correlated with the prob-
ability of future instances of conflict (Wendt & Kiesel, 2011),
subjects could use this contingency to prepare for upcoming
conflict through anticipatory proactive control (Correa et al.,
2009). We predicted that the conflict effect (increased RTs and
decreased accuracy for incongruent vs. congruent trials)
would be reduced when conflict could be expected on the
basis of the duration of a “warning signal” (an intertrial fixa-
tion cross). Surprisingly, the present data point to the exact
opposite conclusion. In fact, the conflict effect was present
only when conflict probability was cued to be high (80 %
incongruent trials), and disappeared when conflict probability
was cued to be low (80 % congruent trials).
Although this result was contrary to our predictions and in
sharp contrast with previous findings of conflict-reducing ef-
fects of temporal cueing (Wendt & Kiesel, 2011), this pattern
of behavioral results was internally consistent with several
distinct manifestations of EEG dynamics, and generalized to
other task settings. First, we obtained strong evidence of in-
creased conflict-related midfrontal theta-band (3–8 Hz) pow-
er, and stronger conflict-related interregional theta synchrony,
specific to situations of high conflict likelihood. These neuro-
physiological underpinnings of cognitive control (Cohen,
2014) correlated across subjects with the behavioral cueing
effect.
Second, in addition to temporal cues, nontemporal,
symbolic cues (here, horizontal bars of different width) in-
creased the conflict effects as well. Only when the cues were
semantically meaningful words that were 100 % valid (e.g.,
the word “hard” always appeared before an incongruent trial),
we found a behavioral benefit with respect to a neutral, unin-
formative (50 % valid) cue. However, this effect was most
pronounced for congruent trials.
Frontal theta dynamics reflect both anticipatory proactive
and posttarget reactive control
Our general EEG results of increased frontal theta power as
well as interregional phase synchrony after conflict are in ac-
cordance with a growing body of findings that have tied fron-
tal theta-band activity to various cognitive control processes,
including conflict adaptation (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011;
Pastötter et al., 2013), error processing (Luu, Tucker, &
Makeig, 2004; van Driel et al., 2012), task switching
(Cunillera et al., 2012), and reinforcement learning
(Cavanagh et al., 2010; van de Vijver, Ridderinkhof, &
Cohen, 2011). An important contribution of this article to
the literature is that midfrontal theta increases can already be
observed before a conflict target, elicited by a conflict-
predicting cue. Moreover, by using time intervals as such
cues, we observed that these anticipatory dynamics waxed
and waned around temporal windows during which the cue
became informative. These intertrial events were perceptually
identical except for duration, showing that midfrontal theta
activity can, in addition to reflecting posttarget control pro-
cesses, be linked to an endogenously generated conflict antic-
ipation process that is based on an internal representation of
time. The surprising finding is that this conflict anticipation
did not produce adaptive behavior; it is thus questionable
whether these anticipatory processes could be regarded as
proactive control. However, a recent study has shown that
under certain circumstances, cue-induced cognitive control
can indeed impair rather than facilitate behavior (Bocanegra
& Hommel, 2014).
Although we observed the “classic” effect of response-
locked conflict-related increases in midfrontal theta power
after target onset (Cohen, Ridderinkhof, Haupt, Elger, &
Fell, 2008; Nigbur, Ivanova, & Stürmer, 2011), this effect
emerged only when conflict probability was cued to be high.
This cue–conflict interaction was present at the single-trial
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2015) 15:787–807 801
level and paralleled the behavioral findings, and both effects
correlated across subjects. Moreover, the theta effect was pres-
ent well before the response, and thus may be a result of the
pretarget cue-related increase in midfrontal theta. Although
this interpretation is post hoc, it may provide an explanation
of our unexpected findings: It is possible that the cue-related
theta effect is, in terms of the underlying mechanism, qualita-
tively different from conflict-related theta (Cohen, 2014). This
view is in accordance with several studies demonstrating that
anticipatory activity in the medial frontal cortex can be inde-
pendent from, and can dampen, subsequent conflict-related
medial frontal activity (Aarts, Roelofs, & van Turennout,
2008; Brown, 2009; Ide, Shenoy, Yu, & Li, 2013; Luks,
Simpson, Dale, & Hough, 2007; Oliveira, Hickey, &
McDonald, 2014). In our task, these processes may have in-
terfered around the time of the response (i.e., during action
selection), resulting in less efficiently applied reactive control.
Varying the interval between cue and target, thereby teasing
apart these processes in time, may be a way to further inves-
tigate this hypothesis.
In addition to conflict-related local power, we reported
interregional theta phase synchrony between midfrontal
and la te ra l f ron ta l (Cohen & Cavanagh, 2011;
Hanslmayr et al., 2008), as well as posterior (Anguera
et al., 2013; Cohen & van Gaal, 2013), sites. This large-
scale functional connectivity was stronger after incongru-
ent than after congruent targets, exclusively following a
cue that was associated with high conflict probability;
after a low-conflict-probability cue, interregional theta-
band connectivity reversed, becoming stronger after con-
gruent than after incongruent targets. This seems incon-
sistent with a recently proposed interpretation of frontal
theta phase synchrony reflecting the top-down implemen-
tation of control in response to general signals of “sur-
prise” (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). That is, the more ob-
vious hypothesis, that unexpected (i.e., surprising) events
should require relatively more control, would predict the
exact opposite. Nonetheless, our connectivity effects were
remarkably strong and were consistent with the local theta
power effects, in terms of both the group-level effects and
the cross-subject correlations.
From an anatomical perspective, mid–lateral frontal the-
ta synchrony has been proposed to reflect MFC–DLPFC
functional connectivity, which increases after conflict has
been encountered (Cohen & Ridderinkhof, 2013). The cur-
rent axiom in the cognitive control literature is that the
MFC monitors for possible instances of conflict, and upon
conflict detection, communicates the need for increased
control to the DLPFC, which further implements control
through top-down signals to motor and task-relevant sen-
sory areas (Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick, Nystrom,
Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Kerns et al., 2004;
MacDonald et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof et al., 2010;
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof, van
den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004). However,
direct regulatory top-down signals from MFC to guide be-
havior in situations of conflict have also been observed
(Cohen et al., 2009; Danielmeier et al., 2011; Kennerley,
Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & Rushworth, 2006;
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et al., 2004), suggesting a more
integrative function of the MFC (Shenhav, Botvinick, &
Cohen, 2013). Our findings of theta synchrony between
midfrontal and posterior parietal regions are in accordance
with this view. This debate notwithstanding, implemented
control signals, be they directly from MFC activity, or in
concert with DLPFC, should increase after uncertain, high-
conflict situations; here, we found that these signals be-
came stronger when a prediction (incongruent or congru-
ent) was met. We now turn to possible alternative explana-
tions for this unexpected finding.
Temporal cues and attention to time
One possible, albeit speculative, explanation of our findings
could be that time intervals are special in serving as cues
triggering specific anticipatory activity (Sperduti, Tallon-
Baudry, Hugueville, & Pouthas, 2011; but see the next para-
graph). Given that the intertrial fixation stimuli were valid
predictors only with respect to their duration, subjects may
have increased their attention to the passage of time especially
when this duration signaled conflict. Research on “temporal
orienting” has shown that attention to time can boost bottom-
up processing of perceptual information (Cravo, Rohenkohl,
Wyart, & Nobre, 2011, 2013; Jepma, Wagenmakers, &
Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Nobre et al., 2007; Rohenkohl, Cravo,
Wyart, & Nobre, 2012), which can interfere with cognitively
controlled action selection (Correa, Cappucci, Nobre, &
Lupiáñez, 2010), presumably because the irrelevant conflict-
ing information is processed to a stronger degree. Thus, in our
study, the temporal cues that predicted high conflict likelihood
may have resulted in more instead of less conflict, by enhanc-
ing sensory processing of the irrelevant (conflicting) spatial
location of the stimulus, through increased attention to time.
However, this explanation would have predicted that neural
activity related to spatial processing would increase after cues
that signaled high conflict probability. In contrast, we found
that contralateral posterior alpha suppression decreased after
incongruent targets; these alpha dynamics were not affected
by cueing. This finding is consistent with lateralized alpha
power reflecting an index of top-down control over spatial
attention (Klimesch, 2012; Sauseng et al., 2005; Thut et al.,
2006), and should here be interpreted as reactive, because the
top-down signal was observed after conflict was encountered.
Moreover, our behavioral follow-up experiment in which
we used nontemporal, symbolic instead of temporal cues also
argues against the explanation of time intervals being special.
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That is, when the pretarget stimuli comprised horizontal bars
that differed in spatial length instead of duration (i.e., “tempo-
ral length”), subjects were again not able to use these cues to
improve behavior, as was evidenced by a similar increase in
conflict effects after high-conflict-probability cueing.
Nonetheless, the use of time as a source of information for
abstract inferences (such as predicting future conflict likeli-
hood) has received little emphasis (Appelbaum et al., 2012;
Wendt & Kiesel, 2011), and thus the underlying processes of
encoding this temporal information as a usable contextual cue
remain largely unknown.
Alternative explanations
Our behavioral results initially seem to be in contrast with
those from studies that have shown beneficial effects of cueing
in conflict tasks (Crump et al., 2006; Fischer, Gottschalk, &
Dreisbach, 2014; Ghinescu, Schachtman, Stadler, Fabiani, &
Gratton, 2010; Gratton et al., 1992; King, Korb, & Egner,
2012). However, a careful examination of this literature pro-
vides some leverage for relating our study to previous
findings.
First, several studies have reported the effect of cueing to
be most prominent on congruent trials (Aarts et al., 2008;
Alpay et al., 2009; Klein & Ivanoff, 2011; Stoffels, 1996;
Strack et al., 2013; Wühr & Kunde, 2008). This is consistent
with our findings. For example, we found that the behavioral
effect of cueing correlated with both midfrontal theta power
and midfrontal–parieto-occipital theta phase synchrony, only
for congruent and not for incongruent trials. Second, some
studies have failed to show clear benefits of cueing in general
(Goldfarb & Henik, 2013; Luks et al., 2007), or on incongru-
ent trials specifically (Strack et al., 2013), and, depending on
the specific task settings, have even reported opposite effects
(Alpay et al., 2009; Wühr & Kunde, 2008). Third, the types of
cues and conflict tasks have differed widely across studies,
while often lacking a detailed rationale as to why these set-
tings were chosen. For example, although some have argued
that a sufficiently long time interval is required between cue
and target in order to generate an expectation about upcoming
conflict (Correa et al., 2009; Monsell, 2003), others have
shown that varying the cue–target interval does not modulate
the cueing effect (Wühr & Kunde, 2008). Indeed, the obser-
vation that features of the target itself can trigger conflict ad-
aptation “on the fly” (King et al., 2012; Lehle & Hübner,
2008) argues for a fairly rapid and flexible form of proactive
control.
Over and above the timing of the cue and target, the nature
of the conflict paradigm itself may be crucial in determining
whether cues can be used for proactive control. Superficially,
conflict tasks such as the Stroop, flanker, and Simon tasks
appear very similar, since they all produce qualitatively simi-
lar behavioral conflict effects; however, the exact
neurocognitive processes that produce these effects may be
markedly different (Hommel, 2011). In the Simon task, the
task-irrelevant dimension of the target location needs to be
processed before the task-relevant dimension of color can be
processed. That is, the target needs to be located before the
color can be determined. In contrast, in the flanker task, the
task-relevant information, which is the central target, can be
processed directly, without processing the task-irrelevant pe-
ripheral distractors. It might be that conflict anticipation only
translates to improved proactive control in conflict paradigms
in which the location of the conflicting, task-irrelevant dimen-
sion is known a priori. Indeed, pretarget cueing of conflict has
been shown to result in behavioral improvement in the flanker
task (Correa et al., 2009).
In the Stroop task, the task-irrelevant and task-relevant
stimulus dimensions share the same location (e.g., the word
RED shown in green). A previous study (Appelbaum et al.,
2012), however, showed that indeed, when these dimensions
are untangled in time (e.g., the word RED first appears in
white, and only subsequently changes color) and when these
moments in time were predictable, performance improved.
Thus, the temporal and spatial predictability of the conflicting
stimulus dimension seems important. Applying this argument
to our findings, it could be that expecting conflict on the basis
of a conflict-predicting cue results in further increased instead
of decreased conflict, because one is not able to a priori sup-
press spatial attention when the conflicting stimulus location
is unknown. In other words, conflict is increased by both the
cue and the target, in an additive manner. However, it is harder
to envisage how this would explain reduced conflict after a
low-conflict-probability cue.
Another alternative explanation for increased behavioral
conflict effects after cues signaling high conflict probability
is that these cues may trigger a generalized cautious response
mode of proactive slowing, possibly through an increased
decision threshold. However, several features of the data argue
against this account. First, general proactive slowing after a
warning cue that signals high conflict likelihood would still
predict a decreased conflict effect. That is, responses to low-
conflict (congruent) trials are usually fast, which would pre-
dict that responses to these trials would be most affected by a
cautious response mode by becoming slower. In contrast to
this prediction, we found that responses to congruent trials
after cues that predicted high conflict probability became
faster. Second, high-conflict trials by themselves are already
characterized by slower responses; thus, a proactive cautious
response mode should affect these trials less; in contrast, we
found that responses to incongruent trials became even slower
when these were cued, as compared to when congruent trials
were cued. Third, one could argue that, by means of a speed–
accuracy trade-off (see Egner, 2007), a cautious, conservative
response mode would be expressed both by slower RTs and
higher accuracy. In other words, the effects on RTs should be
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similar to the effects on accuracy. In contrast to this prediction,
we observed an inverse pattern in accuracy as compared to
RTs, in relation to cueing.
From symbolic, probabilistic cueing to semantic,
deterministic cueing
Our follow-up experiments suggest three additional variables
in conflict cueing that may prove important in disambiguating
our findings. First, the semantic level of the cue may influence
whether and how proactive control can develop (Fischer et al.,
2014; Umbach, Schwager, Frensch, & Gaschler, 2012). In our
study, time intervals and horizontal bars had, in contrast to the
words “HARD” and “EASY,” no a priori relationship with
conflict. Using the word cues, we found no cueing effect when
these cues were probabilistic (i.e., predicting with 80 % valid-
ity upcoming conflict), which is in accordance with results
from another study (Alpay et al., 2009). Other studies have
varied in the semantic level of the cue. For example, it can be
argued that a red cross and a green checkmark (Correa et al.,
2009) contain intrinsic information about conflict to a stronger
degree than do contextual target features (e.g., the color of a
flanker stimulus; Vietze & Wendt, 2009). In addition, the se-
mantic level of arbitrary symbols can change depending on
the task instructions and training (Ghinescu et al., 2010),
which may alter task strategies and conscious experience of
(pretarget) conflict. It has been shown that the latter influence
can modulate the behavioral conflict effect in an opposite
direction (Desender, Van Opstal, & Van den Bussche, 2014).
Second and third, the validity of the cue may be important
(Lai & Mangels, 2007; Vossel, Thiel, & Fink, 2006), which
may or may not require the inclusion of a neutral cue. In our
study, changing the cueing paradigm from probabilistic (80 %
validity) to deterministic (100 % validity) resulted in behav-
ioral improvements, especially on congruent trials and in com-
parison with neutral cues, replicating previous findings (Alpay
et al., 2009; Strack et al., 2013). This effect can be more easily
explained: Neutral cues predict uncertainty, resulting in more
cautious response strategies for both congruent and incongru-
ent trials. On the other hand, valid, explicit cues result in faster
responses in general, which favors the faster “direct” route
through which the irrelevant stimulus dimension (location) is
processed, over the slower “deliberate” route that processes
the relevant stimulus dimension (color) (Ridderinkhof, 2002;
van den Wildenberg et al., 2010). Thus, although conflict-
predicting cues speed up behavior, this increased impulsivity
results in a stronger conflict effect. Interestingly, a study by
Cavanagh, Zambrano Vazquez, and Allen (2012) did not
show effects of cue validity on behavior, and they observed
a very modest decrease of midfrontal theta EEG dynamics for
informative relative to uninformative cues. In designing future
studies involving probabilistic temporal and spatial cues, re-
searchers may wish to include a neutral cue, because this
could provide more insight into whether the obtained costs
of cueing may be related to either impulsivity or cautiousness.
Conclusions
We found a behavioral cost of time-based conflict anticipa-
tion, which was mirrored in frontal theta EEG dynamics and
replicated in other cue and task settings. Previous findings on
pretarget cueing have been mixed, and some of our results can
be linked to these anomalies. However, how exactly informa-
tive cues can hurt instead of help performance in terms of what
is cued needs further research.
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